A fool throws a stone into the sea and a hundred wise men cannot pull it out.
pauses after mentioning Durrell's name, allowing its "magic" to work its way into the conversation, camouflaging what the secretary does for his profession and, in turn, redeeming this man of the militaryindustrial complex.
Said suggests that Durrell's Alexandria Quartet is one of those "novels of questionable worth, but definite status" in that there is an approved separation between the realm of the high-level state bureaucrat and the realm of art and literature. As Said claims, "humanists and intellectuals accept the idea that you can read classy fiction as well as kill and maim because the cultural world is available for that particular sort of camouflaging, and because cultural types are not supposed to interfere in matters for which the social system has not certified them." 1 In seeking to dismantle the rhetoric that masks the connections between land mines and cluster bombs, I think of Said as an inspiration, not least for his revolt against dissociational thinking-what he called in his essay "Secular Criticism" "the petty fiefdoms within the world of intellectual production. This war, Hertzberg asserted, was not the kind that "expanded the battlefield to encompass whole societies." Like most American media commentators at the outset of the current Iraq War, Hertzberg remained inside the smart-war mindset that bought into the idea that so-called smart bombs exhibit a morally exact intelligence. What Hertzberg failed to observe, trailing behind those luminous technologies of precision streaking across the sky, was precision's technological shadow that for years, decades, generations will threaten the lives of random innocents, inflicting untold casualties.
The cluster bomb has become a pivotal actor in the story of smart warfare's shadow deaths, not least because of the energetic efforts of today's warmongers to distinguish morally between the precise, humane, discriminating cluster bomb and the imprecise, indiscriminate, and widely condemned land mine.
In In terms of military strategy, land mines and cluster bombs are both "area denial weapons." The problem is, too often, that "area denial" persists into the postwar era, shrinking the viable earth and straining its resources. As a first step toward alleviating this scourge, we need to acknowledge land mines and cluster bombs as two versions of one problem; we need to recognize the ease with which cluster bombs become de facto land mines.
Fifty-seven nations now possess cluster munitions and sixteen have deployed them, the United States most extensively. Ideally, we should be campaigning (along with the Mennonite Central Committee) for a universal ban on both air-and surface-delivered cluster bombs. But given the daunting pervasiveness of these weapons, it may be more pragmatic to endorse Human Rights Watch's initial demand that all obsolete, high-failure legacy munitions be outlawed. This move ought be supplemented by a moratorium on newer ordnance until a dud rate of less than one percent can be demonstrated. But the ultimate goal should be to outlaw all cluster bombs as weapons of indiscriminate effect. To achieve such a goal, we will first have to start dismantling the whole delusory rhetorical domain of "smart wars" and "precision warfare."
We need to demand, moreover, that the Bush administration's regressive land mine policy be overturned, for the sake of children and adult civilians in as-yet-unimagined wars and for the sake of an environment that remains compromised wherever landmines and cluster bombs congregate. In the words of Kenneth Anderson, director of the Arms Project of Human Rights Watch, "The effects of land mines as a pollutant in the environment are just now beginning to be understood.... All of society pays, over and over again.""13 The same societywide payments are exacted by cluster bomblets-those land mines in masquerade.
Notes

